COURSE TITLE
ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION, AND GAMES: MECHANISM DESIGN
PROFESSOR
CONTENTS
Properties of Social Choice Functions
Kenneth Arrow,
Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., 1963, New York: Wiley.
Allan Gibbard, "
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General result,"
Econometrica, 1973, 587-601.
Mark Satterthwaite, "
Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, 1975, 187-217.
Philip Reny, "
Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach,"
Economic Letters, 2001, 99-105.
Revelation Principle
Maskin.
Efficient Mechanism with Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
Preston McAfee, "
A Dominant Strategy Double Auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, 1992, 434-450.
Hagerty and Rogerson, "
Robust Trading Mechnisms,"
Journal of Economic Theory, 1987, 94-107.
Jernej Copic, "
Ex-Post Constrained-Efficient Bilateral Trade with Risk-averse," job market paper, chapter 1.
Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility under Various Environments
Indirect game / Direct revelation mechanism with ex-post efficiency / DRM with ex-ante efficiency
Ex-post incentive compatiability / Ex-post Nash implementability / Bayes implementability
John Ledyard, "
Incentive Compatibility and incomplete Information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, 1978, 171-189.
Bergemann and Morris, "
Robust Mechanism Design,"
Econometrica, 2005, 1771-1813.
Bargaining under Incomplete Information
Myerson and Satterthwaite, "
Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,"
Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 265-281.
Chatterjee and Samuelson, "
Bargaining under Incomplete Information,"
Operations Research, 1983, 835-851.
Jernej Copic, "
Optimal Robust Bargaining Games," job market paper, chapter 2.
Dynamic Games on Bargaining.
Cremer and McLean, "
Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent,"
Econometrica, 1985, 345-361.
Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu and Zame, "
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation,",
Econometrica, 2006, 585-610.
Matching
Gale and Shapley "
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,"
American Mathematical Monthly, 1962, 9-15.
Roth and Sotomayor,
Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, 1990, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Large Sample Properties of Mechanisms: Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility
Gul and Postlewaite, "
Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information,"
Econometrica, 1992, 1273-1292.
Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams, "
Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica, 1994, 1041-1063.
Jackson and Sonnenschein, "
Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions,"
Econometrica, 2007, 241-257.
Barbera and Jackson, "
Strategy-Proof Exchange,"
Econometrica, 1995, 51-87.
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