ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION, AND GAMES: MECHANISM DESIGN

Jernej Copic

Properties of Social Choice Functions

Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., 1963, New York: Wiley.
Allan Gibbard, "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General result," Econometrica, 1973, 587-601.
Mark Satterthwaite, "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, 1975, 187-217.
Philip Reny, "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economic Letters, 2001, 99-105.

Revelation Principle

Maskin.

Efficient Mechanism with Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
Preston McAfee, "A Dominant Strategy Double Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, 1992, 434-450.
Hagerty and Rogerson, "Robust Trading Mechnisms," Journal of Economic Theory, 1987, 94-107.
Jernej Copic, "Ex-Post Constrained-Efficient Bilateral Trade with Risk-averse," job market paper, chapter 1.

Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility under Various Environments

Indirect game / Direct revelation mechanism with ex-post efficiency / DRM with ex-ante efficiency
Ex-post incentive compatiability / Ex-post Nash implementability / Bayes implementability
John Ledyard, "Incentive Compatibility and incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 1978, 171-189.
Bergemann and Morris, "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, 2005, 1771-1813.

Bargaining under Incomplete Information

Myerson and Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 265-281.
Chatterjee and Samuelson, "Bargaining under Incomplete Information," Operations Research, 1983, 835-851.
Jernej Copic, "Optimal Robust Bargaining Games," job market paper, chapter 2.
Dynamic Games on Bargaining.
Cremer and McLean, "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent," Econometrica, 1985, 345-361.
Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu and Zame, "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation,", Econometrica, 2006, 585-610.

Matching

Gale and Shapley "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly, 1962, 9-15.
Roth and Sotomayor, Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, 1990, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Large Sample Properties of Mechanisms: Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility

Gul and Postlewaite, "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, 1992, 1273-1292.
Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams, "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 1994, 1041-1063.
Jackson and Sonnenschein, "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions," Econometrica, 2007, 241-257.
Barbera and Jackson, "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, 1995, 51-87.